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ABSTRACT 
The quantity of manhours available as a factor input is 
one of the principal determinants of an economy's potential 
output. Although such a measure of labor supply may be strongly 
influenced by population developments, there are several aspects 
of economic behavior that intervene between growth of population 
and growth of manhours. These include the willingness of 
individuals to join the labor force, the aggregate employment 
rate of those in the labor force, and hours worked per employee. 
In the United States, for example, the working-age population 
was 53 percent larger in 1977 than in 1947, yet aggregate man- 
hours worked increased by only 40 percent, and private manhours 
rose by only 27 percent. 
This paper presents an integrated empirical analysis of 
the links between population and labor supply. Determinants of 
labor force participation by age and sex, annual hours per 
worker, and the unemployment rate are examined for the post- 
World War I1 period. The relations estimated for these variables 
are designed for use in a new version of the Hickman-Coen 
annual growth model of the United States, but we take advan- 
tage here of the fact that they form a subsystem which jointly 
determines the supply of manhours, the high-employment 
unemployment rate, and the natural rate of unemployment. We 
show how the subsystem can be so used and give conditional 
estimates of these variables for the historical period 1951-77 
and the future through the year 2000. 
A DISAGGREGATED ANNUAL MODEL OF LABOR 
SUPPLY AND UNEMPLOYMENT, 1951-2000  
1  / Robert M. Coen and Bert G. Hickman- 
This paper presents an empirical model of labor supply that 
jointly determines aggregate manhours, the high-employment un- 
employment rate, and the natural rate of unemployment, conditional 
on population and real wages. The model's structural relations 
are a subset of equations from a new version of the Hickman-Coen 
annual growth model of the United States (Hickman and Coen 1 9 7 6 )  
and are estimated with annual time series for the post-World 
War I1 period. They include: (a) labor force participation 
equations by age and sex, capturing labor force responses to 
employment opportunities and real wages; (b) an equation relating 
hours per worker to variations in labor demand, the real wage 
and the sex composition of the work force; and (c) an aggregate 
unemployment equation in which the natural rate of unemployment 
depends on the degree of mismatch between job requirements and 
workers' skills, the size of the military, and unemployment 
benefits, and deviations between the act~al and natural unemploy- 
ment rates are accounted for by unanticipated wage changes and 
cyclical fluctuations in labor demand, la search theory. 
The model is solved for conditional estimates of manhours, 
the high-employment unemployment rate, and the natural rate of 
unemployment for the historical period 1951-77 and for the future 
through the year 2000. Special attention is given to the im- 
pacts of past and projected changes in the structure of the 
population on labor supply and unemployment. 
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION EQUATIONS BY AGE AND SEX 
Specification of the disaggregated participation equations 
parallels that of the aggregate equation developed in our pre- 
vious work (Coen 1973, Hickman and Coen 1976:67-75). We define 
the participation rate of the i-th age sex group as the ratio 
of civilian labor force to noninstitutional population in that 
group,LCi/NNIi. Each group's participation rate is assumed to 
2/ be influenced by the real after-tax hourly wage rate, Wl/PCE- , 
and by variations in the state of the job market affecting both 
the probabilities of obtaining work and workers' realized in- 
comes. The employment-population ratio, E/NNI, and average 
annual hours per worker, AH1, are presumed to be the principal 
indicators of cyclical changes in job opportunities and earnings 
at a given real wage. A positive relationship between partici- 
pation and E/NNI and AH1 would indicate that cyclical declines 
L 
in employment or hours lead some individuals to become so 
discouraged about their chances of finding a job, or about the 
incomes they will earn if employed, that they leave the labor 
force. Existence of these "discouraged-worker" effects, 
particularly among women and teenagers, has been a principal 
3/ theme in studies of the short-run elasticity of labor supply- . 
Since labor force here encompasses only civilians, we 
allow for influences of military recruitment on participation 
by including the ratio of armed forces to population, LA/NNI. 
There are several ways in which mobilizations might affect the 
size of the labor force. New recruits might be drawn in part 
from the current labor force; potential draftees might withdraw 
from work and return to school in hope of avoiding military 
service; and the loss of income associated with military service 
for young males may lead other members of their families to 
seek employment in the hope of maintaining family income. 
Finally, we introduce a time trend, TIMES, to capture 
changing institutional and social factors not otherwise accounted 
for. 
Table 1 gives estimates of the participation equations for 
males for the period 1950-77. The equations were routinely 
corrected for first-order autocorrelation in the residuals, RHO 
being the estimated autocorrelation coefficient. DW is the 
Durbin-Watson ratio for the RHO-adjusted disturbances, and SEE 
is the standard error of estimate. 
Changes in the real wage are seen to have insignificant 
effects on male participation, with the possible exception of a 
positive relation for males age 45-54. Participation rates of 
25-64 year olds are evidently insensitive to variations in 
employment and hours, while those of younger and older males 
generally decline with employment (discouraged-worker effects) 
but move inversely to hours (added-worker effects). The im- 
pacts of a rise in the armed forces are substantial and negative 
for 18-24 year olds, negative again but smaller for those 25-34, 
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and otherwise negligible. Significant trends appear in the 
equations for 18-19 year olds (upward) and for those 45 years 
of age and older (downward). 
Female participation rates have behaved quite differently 
from male rates. Until the mid-1960'~~ rates for younger women 
were relatively stable, while those for older women were 
generally rising. Thereafter, the former rose dramatically and 
the latter either levelled off or increased at a much slower 
pace. The variables used to explain the male participation rates 
cannot account for these patterns. One could, of course, intro- 
duce appropriate breaks in the time trends to improve the 
equations (see, for example, Perry 1977), but we have chosen 
instead to examine an hypothesis proposed by Easterlin (1978) 
which accords an important role to demographic changes in deter- 
mining participation rates of women. 
Easterlin argues that participation of women has been much 
influenced by changes in the age structure of the male popula- 
tion, at least since immigration to the U.S. was restricted in 
the 1920's. Assuming that younger and older males are not 
substitutable in the eyes of employers, and that younger males 
have a more or less fixed participation rate, a rise in the 
ratio of younger to older males should drive down the earnings 
of younger males, below what they might have aspired to earn. 
As a result, younger women seek.employment in greater numbers 
to supplement their husbands1 earnings. Assuming that younger 
and older women are highly s l ~ b s t i t u t a b l e t o e m p l o y e r s ,  the influx 
of younger women tends to restrict job opportunities for older 
women, who leave the labor force discouraged. Thus, according 
to this hypothesis, we should expect participation rates of 
younger women t o  b e  p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  r a t i o  o f  younger 
t o  o l d e r  m a l e s ,  w h i l e  t h o s e  o f  o l d e r  women s h o u l d  b e  n e g a t i v e l y  
r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  same r a t i o .  
The female  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  e q u a t i o n s  i n  Tab le  2  t e s t  t h e  
E a s t e r l i n  h y p o t h e s i s  by a d d i n g  a  new v a r i a b l e  NNIMRAT, t h e  
t h e  r a t i o  o f  ma les  16-34 t o  t h o s e  35-64 i n  t h e  n o n i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
p o p u l a t i o n .  (NNIMRAT was a b o u t  0.86 i n  1949,  d e c l i n e d  r a t h e r  
s t e a d i l y  t o  0.76 i n  1962,  and t h e n  r o s e  s t e a d i l y  t o  1.08 i n  1977 . )  
The h y p o t h e s i s  i s  s t r i k i n g l y  conf i rmed .  NNIMRAT i s  h i g h l y  s i g -  
n i f i c a n t  i n  a l l  b u t  one o f  t h e  e q u a t i o n s ,  and t h e  s i g n  o f  i t s  
c o e f f i c i e n t  changes  from p o s i t i v e  t o  n e g a t i v e  a s  w e  move from 
t h e  younger g r o u p s  t o  t h e  o l d e r .  
The c o n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  s i g n s  on NNIMRAT and  on t h e  t i m e  
t r e n d s  s u g g e s t s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
p a t t e r n s .  For  f e m a l e s  16-44, p o s i t i v e  t r e n d s  were o f f s e t  by t h e  
d e c l i n e  i n  NNIMRAT t h r o u g h  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 6 0 ' s ;  t h e r e a f t e r ,  t h e  
t r e n d s  and growth o f  NNIMRAT r e i n f o r c e d  one  a n o t h e r  r e s u l t i n g  i n  
l a r g e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  For  f e m a l e s  45-64, p o s i t i v e  
t r e n d s  and NNIMRAT i n t e r a c t  i n  t h e  o p p o s i t e  way, r e i n f o r c i n g  
one a n o t h e r  t o  augment p a r t i c i p a t i o n  t h r o u g h  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 6 0 1 s ,  
a f t e r  which t i m e  t h e  growth i n  NNIMRAT b e g i n s  t o  o f f s e t  t h e  t r e n d s .  
Some o t h e r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  e q u a t i o n s  f o r  f e m a l e s  
a r e  wor th  n o t i n g .  The c y c l i c a l  i n d i c a t o r s  o f  l a b o r  marke t  con- 
d i t i o n s ,  E / N N I  and AH1, have much s t r o n g e r  e f f e c t s  t h a n  i n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  ma les .  S i g n i f i c a n t  d i scouraged-worker  r e s p o n s e s  t o  
employment changes  a r e  e v i d e n t  f o r  most  f e m a l e  g r o u p s ,  t h e  
g r e a t e s t  s e n s i t i v i t y  o c c u r r i n g  i n  t h e  younger  g r o u p s .  Modest 
added-worker r e s p o n s e s  a r e  found ,  however,  f o r  changes  i n  h o u r s  
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i n  s e v e r a l  g r o u p s .  The r e a l  wage a l s o  a p p e a r s  t o  p l a y  a  l a r g e r  
r o l e  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  female  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  t h a n  male p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e r e  i s  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n v e r s e  r e l a t i o n  between 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s  o f  younger  women and t h e  r e a l  wage. The 
armed f o r c e s  v a r i a b l e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  d o e s  n o t  c o n t r i b u t e  
much t o  e x p l a i n i n g  female  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  
Responses  o f  t h e  t o t a l  l a b o r  f o r c e  t o  changes  i n  a g g r e g a t e  
employment,  e t c . ,  a r e  n o t  r e a d i l y  d i s c e r n i b l e  from T a b l e s  l a n d  
2 ,  s i n c e  t h e s e  r e s p o n s e s  depend o n  t h e  age-sex  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  
t h e p o p u l a t i o n .  The e s t i m a t e d  c o e f f i c i e n t s  imply  t h a t  f o r  t h e  
y e a r s  1950-62, a  one  p e r c e n t  i n c r e a s e  i n  employment would have  
produced a b o u t  a  0.34 p e r c e n t  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  t o t a l  l a b o r  f o r c e .  
T h e r e a f t e r ,  t h e  employment e l a s t i c i t y  g r a d u a l l y  i n c r e a s e s  t o  
0.37 by t h e  mid-1960 's  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  r i se  i n  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  
o f  y o u t h  i n  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n .  Throughout  t h e  sample p e r i o d ,  r o u g h l y  
60 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  l a b o r  f o r c e  i s  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  by  
women. The r e a l  wage e l a s t i c i t y  r ises from -0.04 i n  t h e  e a r l y  
pos twar  y e a r s  t o  -0.07 i n  t h e  1 9 7 0 1 s ,  i n d i c a t i n g  growing l a b o r  
f o r c e  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  t h e  r e a l  wage a s  w e l l  a s  t o  employment. 
The wage e l a s t i c i t y  f o r  m a l e s  a s  a  g r o u p  i s  v i r t u a l l y  z e r o ;  
t h e  n e g a t i v e  wage e l a s t i c i t i e s  r e f l e c t  p r i m a r i l y  t h e  n e t  exodus  
o f  young f e m a l e s  from t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  a s  t h e  wage i n c r e a s e s .  
THE AVERAGE HOURS EQUATION 
Our e q u a t i o n  f o r  a n n u a l  h o u r s  p e r  worker  i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  
s e c t o r  i s  a  h y b r i d  r e l a t i o n  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  b o t h  s u p p l y  and de-  
mand f a c t o r s .  Worlcers' d e s i r e d  h ~ u r s  a r e  assumed t o  depend 
o n  t h e  r e a l  a f t e r - t a x  wage i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ,  W ~ / P C E .  
A c t u a l  h o u r s  may d i v e r g e  from d e s i r e d  h o u r s ,  however,  d u e  t o  
cyclical variations in the demand for labor. Our proxy for 
these cyclical effects is the conventional unemployment rate, 
u1. 
Although we do not disaggregate hours by age and sex, 
we allow for the possible effects of changes in the composition 
of the labor force on average hours. The hypothesis that 
naturally suggests itself is that average hours will tend to 
decline as the proportion of teenagers and women in the labor 
force rises, since these groups are more inclined to be en- 
gaged in part-time work. We test three compositional variables: 
the ratio of teenagers to total labor force, LCT; the ratio of 
women age 20 and over to total labor force, LCW; and the sum of 
these two ratios, LCTW. 
Table 3 presents alternative estimates of the hours 
equation. The first equation, which resembles the one appearing 
in the published version of the Hicknan-Coen model (1976:67-751, 
indicates significant negative effects of the real wage and un- 
employment on hours. Inclusion of the labor-force composition 
variables has little effect on the estimated unemployment 
elasticity, but it substantially reduces the real-wage elasticity. 
Of the three compositional variables, LCW yields the best results, 
i:nd we therefore utilize the third equation in subsequent analyses. 
TfIE HIGH-EFIPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND LABOR SUPPLY 
The estimated labor force and hours equations, together 
with several identities, constitute an interdependent system 
which for a given unemployment rate (and other right-hand 
variables exogenous to the system) jointly determines the labor 
m 
Q) 
f-l 
force by age and sex, average hours, and aggregate employment. 
Setting the unemployment rate equal to an assumed high-employment 
value, manhours at high-employment could thus be estimated. 
Until recent years, a conventional assumption in studies of 
potential labor supply was that an aggregate unemployment rate 
of 4 percent characterized high employment; but as the composi- 
tion of the labor force has shifted toward women and teenagers, 
groups with typically higher unemployment rates than prime-age 
males, the high-employment unemployment rate has generally been 
presumed to be rising. To allow for this possibility, we shall 
include the high-employment unemployment rate itself as an 
additional endogenous variable, in the manner described below. 
Let us define U7 as the high-employment unemployment rate 
and use the suffix "7" to denote high-employment levels of the 
variables to which it is attached. For example, LC7, E7, and 
AH7 are high-employment levels of civilian labor force, aggre- 
gate employment, and private average hours. Average hours at 
high employment are then calculated as 
AH7 = exp [c10 + cl i'kl(W3/FCE) + cl [ ~ i ( U i )  
where the c's are estimated coefficients from the average hours 
regressicn. High-~mployment enployment is defined by 
E7 is allocated between private employment, EP7, and public 
employment, EG7, according to the "ncrmal" ratio of private to 
total employment, WHT1; that is, 
The p r o d u c t  
g i v e s  p r i v a t e  manhours ,  o u r  b a s i c  measu re  o f  l a b o r  s u p p l y  a t  
h i g h  employment .  
Economy-wide a v e r a g e  h o u r s  and  t h e  economy-wide r e a l  
a f t e r - t a x  wage, which  e n t e r  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
e q u a t i o n s ,  a r e  c a l c u l a t e d  a s  w e i g h t e d  a v e r a g e s  o f  t h e i r  p r i v a t e -  
and p u b l i c - s e c t o r  v a l u e s .  Assuming t h a t  a v e r a g e  h o u r s  i n  t h e  
p u b l i c  s e c t o r  a r e  c o n s t a n t  a t  2 ,000  p e r  y e a r ,  w e  h a v e :  
where WG i s  t h e  a f t e r - t a x  money wage i n  t h e  p u b l i c  sec tor .  High- 
employment l a b o r  f o r c e  f o r  t h e  i - t h  a g e - s e x  g r o u p  ( t h e r e  a r e  
1 6  g r o u p s  i n  a l l )  i s  t h e n  g i v e n  by 
and  t h e  i d e n t i t i e s  
define the total labor force and the proportion of women age 
20  and over in the labor force at high employment. 
Finally, we express U7 as a weighted average of unernploy- 
ment rates by age and sex in a high-employment base year, the 
weights being the proportions of the high-employment labor force 
in each age-sex group. Thus, 
As the composition of the labor force changes over time, U7 will, 
of course, vary. A unique feature of the system (1 ) - ( 1  1 ) is 
that it jointly determines the weights and U7 and assures that 
their values are consistent with the behavioral relations ( 1 )  
and ( 8 ) .  
We have solved this system for the sample period 1 9 5 1 - 7 7  
and for the post-sample years 1 9 7 8 - 2 0 0 0 .  We choose 1 9 5 6  as the 
base year for the unemployment rates by age and sex, since it 
is widely regarded as a time of high employment, the agcjregate 
unemployment rate being 4 . 1  percent. The 1 9 5 6  unemployment 
rates are as follows: 
Age Group 
1 6 - 1 7  
1 8 - 1 9  
20 -24  
25-34  
35 -44  
45-54  
5  5  -6 4  
6 5 +  
Males Females 
1 3 . 2  
9 . 9  
6 . 3  
4 . 8  
3 . 9  
3 . 6  
3 . 6  
2 . 3  
The population projections, which are crucial inputs for the 
post-sample calculations, arederived from the Census Series I1 
estimates of total population by age and sex (U.S. Department 
of Commerce 1977). The Census estimate for each group is ad- 
justed to a noninstitutional basis by applying the corresponding 
1974 ratio of noninstitutional to total population. To aid the 
reader in interpreting our results, Table 4 presents growth 
rates of noninstitutional population by age and sex for selected 
intervals in the sample and post-sample periods. 
Real wages and the ratio of armed forces to population are 
set equal to their actual values for the sample period; thereafter, 
real wages are assumed to grow at 2 percent per year, and the 
armed forces ratio is held constant at its 1977 level, 0.013. The 
trend value of EP/E is used for WHT1 through 1974; WHT1 is then 
held constant at its 1974 level, 0.846. 
Our initial projections of the system produced unreasonably 
large declines in the participation rates of males age 55 and 
over, groups for which large negative trends in participation 
- 
are evident over the sample period. Tendencies toward earlier 
retirement probably account for the strength of these trends, 
but in view of recent legislation raising the retirement age, 
among other things, there is good reason to believe that they 
will not persist. (If they do, there will be no males age 65 
and over in the labor force by the year 2000:) 
Hence, we decided to suppress the trend coefficients for these 
two groups beginning in 1978. With these adjustments, the pro- 
jections indicate gradual increases in the participation rates 
Table  4 
Growth R a t e s  of N o n i n s t i t ~ l t i o n a l  P o p u l a t i o n  
by Age and S e x ,  1951-2000 
Annual Exponen t i a l  Ra tes  of Changes 
P e r i o d  Age Group 
Sample 
1951-1955 
1956-1 960 
1961-1965 
1966-1970 
1971-1977 
P r o j e c t  i o n s  
Samp l e  
1951-1955 
1956-1960 
1961-1965 
1966-1970 
1971-1977 
P r o j e c t i o n s  
1978-1980 
1981-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1996-2000 
16-17 18-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 6 5+ 
Males 
Females 
of both groups between 1977 and 2000 - from 0.74 to 0.81 for the 
55-64 group, and from 0.21 to 0.29 for those 65 and over .4/ 
The computed values of U7 are shown in Table 5. The series 
declines very slightly from 1951-55, then rises to a peak in 
1977. The modest gyrations in U7 over the sample period are 
primarily due to fluctuations in the armed forces, as can be 
seen by comparing U71, based on trend values of LA/NNI, with 
U7. On average, U7 exceeded the actual unemployment rate by 
0.30 of a percentage point during the first half of the 1956's 
and by 0.48 of a percentage point in the last half of the 1960's; 
otherwise the actual unemployment rate was well above U7, the 
largest one-year gap being 3.76 percentage points in 1975. 
Since U7 is a weighted average of the 1956 unemployment 
rates, and since the labor force proportions that constitute 
the weights depend very strongly on the composition of the non- 
institutional population, it would seem that trends in U7 would 
largely be attributable to changes in the population distribution. 
To examine this supposition, we computed a third variant, U72, 
which like U71 is based on the trend values of LA/NMI, but which 
holds the composition of the noninstitutional population by age 
and sex fixed at that observed in 1956. It should be noted that 
only the composition of NNI is fixed; total NNI follows its 
actual path over the sample period. We see that there would 
have been some slight upward drift in the high-employment un- 
employment rate even in the absence of large changes in the 
Table  5 
A c t u a l  and High-Employment Unemployment R a t e s ,  1951-2000 
( I n  P e r c e n t )  
Sample P e r i o d  P r o j e c t i o n  
Year U 1 U7- a  / b / U71- ~ 7  25' 
Average Va lues  
Year U 7  
a .  Based on a c t u a l  v a l u e s  of LA/NNI. 
b.  Based on t r e n d  v a l u e s  of LA/NNI. 
c. Based on t r e n d  v a l u e s  of  LAINN1 and c o n s t a n t  (1956) d i s t r i b u t i o n  of 
p o p u l a t i o n  by a g e  and s e x .  
distribution of NNI. The reason for this is that changes in 
wages and armed forces and the influences of trends would still 
have worked in the direction of increasing the labor force 
proportions of groups with relatively high base-year unemployment 
rates. Nonetheless, the leading role of population distribution 
as a determinent of U7 is evident. Had it not been for changes 
in this distribution, U7 would have risen by only about 0.1 
instead of about 0.6 of a percentage point. 
Turning to the projections, we see the striking effects of 
the increase in the average age of the population following re- 
cent declines in the birth rate. U7 declines steadily from its 
1977 peak of 4.70 percent to a low of 4.19 percent in 1996-97. 
Table 6 reports growth rates of labor supply associated 
with the high-employment unemployment rate, U7. The growth rate 
of high-employment private manhours accelerated throughout the 
sample period despite the upward trendinU7 and declines in AH7. 
Increasing growth of MNI, accompanied by a rising aggregate 
participation ratelespecially from 1966-77, accounted for this 
phenomenon. But the growth rate of rnanhours is projected to 
decline well into the 1990's. Although (a) U7 will be falling, 
(b) decreases in AH7 are forecast to be more moderate than those 
recently experienced, and (c) the aggregate participation rate 
should continue to rise (from 0.62 in 1977 to 0.67 in 2000), 
these factors combined are not strong enough to offset the de- 
clining growth of NNI. 
T a b l e  6 
Measures of  Labor Supply Growth a t  
High Employment, 1951-2000 
Annual E x p o n e n t i a l  R a t e s  of Change 
N o n i n s t i t u t i o n a l  C i v i l i a n  Annual Hour 
P e r i o d  P o p u l a t i o n  a  I Labor F o r c e  ~ m ~ l o y m e n t ~ '  P e r  Workers7 Manhours- 
Sample P e r i o d  
0.83 0.56 
1.46 1 .14  
1 .24  0.9 1 
2.13 1.78 
2.49 2.32 
P r o j e c t i o n s  
1.98  1 .99  
1.54 1 .58  
1.05 1.08 
0.87 0.90 
1.24 1 .24  
a .  P r i v a t e  s e c t o r .  
THE UNEMPLOYMENT EQUATION 
Our unemployment equation discriminates between the short- 
run ordisequilibrium components primarily stressed in search 
theory and the long-term or equilibrium components of the mis- 
match hypothesisy. Given the decision to enter or remain in 
the labor force, one must still decide whether to retain one's 
job if employed, or if unemployed, whether to accept new offers 
as they become available or to continue instead to search for 
a better opening. It is not implied that all unemployment 
represents a voluntary decision to wait for a better offer, 
however, since workers in distressed locations or who are lack- 
ing in skills or education may not receive offers of any kind 
for lengthy periods despite their search. Because the compo- 
sition of the labor force has increasingly shifted towards 
higher proportions of teenagers and women since the mid-1950's, 
a growing mismatch between job requirements and workers' skills 
has tended to raise the equilibrium or "natural" unemployment 
rate. 
In this context the natural rate is conceptually the 
aggregate unemployment rate which at a given time would be con- 
sistent with general equilibrium in the labor and commodity 
markets, after due allowance for market imperfections, and 
would yield an equilibrium structure of real wage rates 
(Friedman 1968). In our empirical formulation it is assumed 
that the natural rate has been influenced by three principal 
factors over the postwar period: the shifts in the age-sex 
composition of the labor force, the size of the armed forces 
relative to population, and the ratio of average unemployment 
benefits to the private wage rate. Fluctuations of the actual 
unemployment rate relative to the natural rate are explained by 
two disequilibrium search variables: the ratio of the actual 
to the expected wage rate and the ratio of actual to high- 
employment employment. 
In order to state the behavioral hypotheses concerning 
job search and mismatch, it is convenient to decompose the un- 
employment rate into two multiplicative components. The first 
is the annual search ratio, defined as USR = UNS/LC, where UMS 
is the annual flow of new job searchers and LC is the civilian 
labor force. The second component is the average duration of 
search, UADS, defined as the average number of weeks per spell 
of unemployment divided by the 52 weeks of the year. Since the 
number of persons unemployed, UN1, equals the product of UNS and 
UADS, it follows that: 
Ul E UM1 / LC - (UNS) (UAES) / LC E (USR) (UAES) . ( 1 2 )  
Hence the unemployment rate will vary proportionately to changes 
in either USR or UADS. 
The Average Duration of Search 
A basic hypothesis of search theory is that the average 
duration of search, UADS, should be inversely related to devia- 
tions of actual from expected wage rates. A worker's optimal 
search strategy is to select a reservation wage and to visit a 
sequence of potential employers until he or she is offered a 
wage at or above the reservation level. The reservation wage 
will be selected from the expected probability distribution of 
wage offers, and this will determine the expected probability 
of obtaining an offer at or above the reservation level on any 
particular visit. The average number of visits before an 
acceptable offer is received is the reciprocal of this probability, 
and the average number of visits times the average length of 
time between visits (assumed constant) equals the average duration 
of search. 
An upward shift of the actual relative to the expected wage 
distribution will increase the probability of an acceptable offer 
on any given visit and thereby reduce the average duration of 
search and unemployment rate. In our formulation the expected 
and actual wage distributions are represented by their respective 
means without explicit use of higher moments. We also include, 
however, the relative deviation of actual employment from its 
high-employment level as an argument in the equation for UADS. 
This is because the increased job vacancies associated with a 
cyclical upshift of labor demand would increase the probability 
of an acceptable offer on a particular visit even if the realized 
mean wage did not increase relative to that expected. 
Another factor which may affect UADS is the availability 
of unemployment compensation, since this reduces the cost of 
unemployment to the worker (Feldstein 1975). An increase of 
average unemployment benefits relative to average weekly earnings, 
for example, may lengthen the average period of search. Since 
unemployment benefits are nontaxable, the appropriate comparison 
is with average after-tax earnings from employment. 
The average durationof search may vary inversely with the 
relative size of the armed forces. New military recruits will 
consist primarily of young males, an age group in which un- 
skilled workers are especially prevalent. A mobilization will 
therefore tend to reduce UADS by removing disproportionately 
from the civilian labor force a population group in which the 
probability of a job offer at even the minimum legal wage is 
small. 
Conversely, an increase in the proportions of teenagers 
and women in the population will increase UADS, since various 
wage inflexibilities inhibit firms from creating more jobs for 
unskilled workers even as vacancies for skilled workers go un- 
filled. 
The Search Ratio 
The ratio of new job searchers to the civilian labor force, 
USR, should respond to the same determinants as does UADS, and 
usually with the same sign. As labor demand increases cycli- 
cally, firings and layoffs decrease. This reduced flow of 
involuntary separations is partly offset by induced increases 
in quits and the number of new entrants and reentrants to the 
labor force; but the overall relationship between employment 
fluctuations and the search ratio is likely to be negative. 
Similarly, an increase in the armed forces reduces the search 
ratio. New military recruits come primarily from age groups 
with high unemployment rates, and when an unemployed recruit 
leaves the civilian labor force the numerator of the search 
r a t i o  i s  r e d u c e d  r e l a t i v e l y  more t h a n  t h e  d e n o m i n a t o r .  F o r  
t h e  same r e a s o n ,  i f  young p o t e n t i a l  e n t r a n t s  o r  r e e n t r a n t s  t o  
t h e  c i v i l i a n  l a b o r  f o r c e  e n l i s t  o r  a r e  d r a f t e d ,  o r  s t a y  a t  
s c h o o l  t o  a v o i d  t h e  d r a f t ,  t h e  s e a r c h  r a t i o  i s  d e c r e a s e d .  
R e l a t i v e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  unemployment compensa t ionmay  r a i s e  
USR by i n d u c i n g  a d d i t i o n a l  v o l u n t a r y  q u i t s  i n  o r d e r  t o  s e a r c h  
f o r  b e t t e r  j o b s  w h i l e  t e m p o r a r i l y  s u p p o r t e d  by unemployment 
b e n e f i t s .  A r i s i n g  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  women a n d  t e e n a g e r s  i n  t h e  
l a b o r  f o r c e  w i l l  t e n d  a l s o  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  s e a r c h  r a t i o  owing 
t o  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  mismatch  be tween j o b  o p e n i n g s  and  s k i l l s .  
U n l i k e  UADS, USR may b e  p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  u n e x p e c t e d  
c h a n g e s  i n  wage r a t e s .  A g r e a t e r  t h a n  e x p e c t e d  wage i n c r e a s e  
may t e n d  t o  r a i s e  t h e  s e a r c h  r a t i o  by i n d u c i n g  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  
q u i t s  a s  w o r k e r s  r e e v a l u a t e  t h e i r  p r o s p e c t s  o f  o b t a i n i n g  a  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h i g h e r  wage by f i n d i n g  a  new j o b .  A d d i t i o n a l  
e n t r i e s  i n t o  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  by f o r m e r l y  d i s c o u r a g e d  w o r k e r s  
i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  improved  wage p r o s p e c t s  may a l s o  r a i s e  t h e  
s e a r c h  r a t i o .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  w e  e x p e c t  a  n e t  n e g a t i v e  c o r r e -  
l a t i o n  be tween t h e  unemployment r a t e  a n d  t h e  wage d e v i a t i o n  
t e r m s ,  owing t o  t h e  s t r o n g  n e g a t i v e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  
o n  t h e  a v e r a g e  d u r a t i o n  o f  s e a r c h .  
The E s t i m a t i n g  E q u a t i o n  
The e s t i m a t i n g  e q u a t i o n  i s  
where W4 is the observed wage rate (average hourly earnings 
net of employers' contributions to social security programs), 
WE is the expected level of W4, ABU is the ratio of average 
weekly unemployment benefits to average weekly earnings after 
taxes, and the other variables are as previously defined. 
The first three terms of equation (1 3) relate to the dis- 
equilibrium elements of unemployment, whereas the remaining 
terms are the determinants of the natural rate. Movements in 
the natural rate owing to the changes in the age-sex composition 
of the labor force are incorporated in U7 by construction, and 
to this we add the armed forces and unemployment benefits ratios 
with elasticities to be estimated by the regression. 
Wage Expectations 
An expression for the expected wage, WE, must be specified 
to implement the wage surprise term in (13). Autoregressive 
equations in W4 and in W4/PCE were tested, but the best ex- 
planations of unemployment were obtained when wage expectations 
were modelled from the following equation estimated over 1950-77: 
E ~ =  . 9 9 8 8  SEE = .0199 DW = 2.049 (14) 
On the assumption that workers ignore other systematic information 
in forming wage expectations, the rational expectations prediction 
of the expected wage is given by 
Thus nominal wages are expected to rise by 4.5 percent per year 
plus a variable amount related to the rate of consumer price in- 
flation in the preceding year. Apart from its superiority as 
an explanatory variable in the unemployment equation, this 
formulation has the advantage of incorporating a feedback from 
previous consumer price inflation, including that due to exogenous 
foreign price disturbances, into current wage expectations. 
Parameter Estimates 
Equation (13) was estimated by ordinary least squares over 
the period 1951-1977 and is shown as the first regression in 
Table 7. The search-theory hypotheses concerning disequilibrium 
unemployment are rather strongly confirmed. The coefficients of 
the current and lagged wage surprise terms are significant and 
correctly signed, indicating that unexpectedly high wage offers 
substantially reduce the average duration of search and the un- 
employment rate. A rise of private employment relative to its 
high-employment level has an even larger effect on unemployment 
as it simultaneously reduces the search ratio and the average 
duration of search. 
The evidence about the influence of military employment 
and unemployment benefits on thenatural rate of unemployment 
is weaker. Both LA/NNI and ABU have the correct signs, but 
their t-ratios are below the 5 percent level of significance. 
An alternative formulation inwhich ABU was corrected for broaden- 
ing coverage of unemployment insurance programs, by multiplying 
the benefits/earnings ratio by the ratio of covered employees 
to the civilian labor force, resulted in a wronq sign for the 

modified ABU variable, as may be seen from the second equation 
in Table 7. We therefore accept the first version of the equation 
and regard the correct signs on LA/NNI and ABU as weak con- 
firmation of the expected contributions of these variables to 
variations in the natural unemployment rate over the postwar years. 
The reader will have noted that our unemployment equation 
resembles the "Lucas labor supply fuction" as utilized in 
Lucas ( 1 9 7 3 )  and Sargent ( 1 9 7 6 ) .  It differs from these earlier 
formulations in significant ways, however. Firstithe fundamental 
labor supply function in our model is the disaggregated model 
of labor force participation, which determines the size of the 
labor force as a function of the real wage rate and population. 
Second, and most important, the Lucas and Sargent formulations 
embody the hypothesis that variations in unemployment not attri- 
butable to the unexpected component of wage changes are due to 
variations in the natural rate of unemployment. In contrast, 
the ratio of actual employment to its high-employment level is 
an important explanatory variable in our equation, so that 
cyclical fluctuations in the demand for labor have direct effects 
on unemployment in addition to their indirect effects operating 
through unexpected wage changes. The indirect wage effects are 
channeled through the average duration of search, whereas the 
direct employment effects impinge on the search ratio as well. 
Because of these direct employment effects, the unemployment 
rate would fluctuate cyclically in our model even if all wage 
changes were fully anticipated. 
THE NATURAL RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
A time series estimate of the natural unemployment rate, 
denoted as U17, may be obtained by purging the unemployment 
equation (13) of its disequilibrium components. Assuming 
equality between the actual and expected wage and high employ- 
ment of the private labor force, the equation to determine the 
natural rate is: 
Calculated values of U17, based on historical values of the 
armed forces and benefits/earnings ratios, are compared with 
the actual unemployment rate during 1951-77 in Table 8. 
The natural rate is seen to rise from an average of 4.07 
percent during 1951-60 to 4.35 in 1961-70 and 4.88 in 1971-77. 
The 1976-77 average is 4.96. The actual unemployment rate was 
0.46 of a percentage point higher than the natural rate in 
1951-60, 0.36 higher in 1961-70, 1.58 higher in 1971-77, and 
2.38 higher in 1976-77. The actual rate fell below the natural 
rate during the Korean and Vietnam wars but was otherwise 
generally above it. 
Successive mobilizations and demobilizations during and 
after these wars, as well as some slight fluctuations in ABU, 
induced corresponding swings in the natural rate. This may be 
seen by comparing U171, based on trend values of the armed 
forces and benefits/earnings ratios, with U17. Had these 
ratios not fluctuated about their trends, the natural rate 
would have remained virtually constant between 1951 and 1956 
and risen steadily thereafter. 
Table 8 
Actual and Natural Unemployment Rates, 1951-2000 
(In Percent) 
Sample Period 
Year U 1 U171- ~ 1 7 2 ~ '  a / U17- b I 
Average Values 
Proiection 
Year U 17 
a. Based on U7 and actual values of LAINNI and ABU. 
b. Based on U71 and trend values of LA/NNI and ABU. 
c. Based on U72 and trend values of LA/NNI and ABU. 
The third variant, U172, appearing in Table 8 is again 
based on trend values of LA/NNI and ABU, but it illustrates how 
the natural rate would have behaved had the 1956 population 
distribution prevailed throughout the period. U171 and U172 
are roughly the same through 1959. With a constant population 
distribution, the natural rate would have risen by C.38 of a 
percentage point by 1977, whereas with changes in this distri- 
bution, the rate risesby0.81. Thus, somewhat less than half 
the increase in the natural rate may be attributed to changes 
in LA/MNI and ABU, the remainder being due to shifts in the 
age-sex structure ofthe population. 
The projections of U17 shown in the last column are based 
on the projected path of U7 (Table 5) and on the assumption 
that LA/NNI and ABU will remain at their 1977 levels. With no 
change in these ratios, U17 remains above U7 by a roughly con- 
stant 0.2 of a percentage point. However, were the armed forces 
to rise from 1.3 to about 2.0 perrent of the population between 
1977 and 2000, or were unemployment benefits to decline from 
40.4 to 37.7 percent of private earnings, thehigh-employment 
and natural rates would be identical in 2000. 
The equation system (1 ) - (1 1) can be used to determine 
labor supply growth conditional on the natural rate of unemploy- 
ment. All that is required algebraically is to replace U7 by 
U17 and delete equation (11). We do not display the results of 
such calculations because they are very similar to those given 
in Table 6. Over the sample intervals, manhours associated with 
the natural rate grow more rapidly in 1951-55 (0.35 rather than 
0.22 percent year) and in 1961-65 (0.79 compared to 0.69). 
Otherwise, they lag behind the growth of high-employment man- 
hours (0.46 compared to 0.59 in 1956-60, 0.96 compared to 1.01 
in 1966-70, and 1.90 compared to 1.94 in 1971-77). The projected 
rates of growth of manhours to 2000 are virtually identical for 
U7 and U17. 
CONCLUSION 
The principal novelty of the model developed in this paper 
is that it jointly determines labor supply, the high-employment 
unemployment rate, and the natural rate of unemployment. The 
model highlights in several ways the usefulness and importance 
of age-sex disaggregation in studying aggregate labor supply 
and unemployment. Differences in labor force participation 
behavior among age-sex groups account in part for the changing 
relationship between population growth and labor force growth, 
and the age structure of the male population appears to play a 
central role in shaping patterns of female participation. Much 
of the secular decline in average hours is explained by the grow- 
ing proportion of women in the labor force. Finally, age-sex 
disaggregation makes possible endogenous determination of a high- 
employment unemployment rate whose variations over time are 
attributable to structural changes in the labor force and con- 
sequent mismatches between job requirements and workers' skills. 
The high-employment unemployment rate is, in turn, a principal 
determinant of movements in the natural and observed unemploy- 
ment rates. 
Other features of the model's key empirical relations, 
describing the direct determinants of actual labor force, hours, 
and unemployment, are of considerable interest. We find that 
labor force and hours respond inversely to changes in real wages 
but with rather small elasticities. Nearly all the sensitivity 
of labor force to real wages results from changes in partici- 
pation of younger females. Since average hours are negatively 
related to the relative number of women in the labor force, a 
rise in real wages has an indirect, positive effect on hours. 
With regard to the unemployment equation, unanticipated 
wage increases tend to reduce the actual unemployment rate, in 
accord with the predictions of search theory; but cyclical 
fluctuations in the demand for labor, as measured by the ratio 
of actual to high-employment employment , also have significant 
negative impacts on the actual unemployment rate. Thus, in our 
system, deviations of the actual from the natural unemployment 
rate are not solely due to unanticipated changes in wages. 
Although our labor force equations do not themselves in- 
corporate effects of wage surprises on participation, such 
effects are nonetheless present in the complete system. Since 
an unanticipated wage increase reduces the number of unemployed 
for a given labor force, and since aggregate labor force partici- 
pation rises as employment increases, a positive wage surprise 
must have a positive indirect effect on labor force. 
In using the system to generate joint estimates of labor 
supply, the high-employment unemployment rate, and the natural 
unemployment rate, we suppressed the disequilibrium elements in 
the unemployment equation, imposing equality between expected 
and actual wages and between actual and high-employment employ- 
ment. We were still faced, however, with choosing a time path 
for real wages. Our decision to use the actual path of real 
wages o v e r  t h e  s ample  p e r i o d  and assume two p e r c e n t  g rbwth  
t h e r e a f t e r  i s  a d m i t t e d l y  a r b i t r a r y .  The a r b i t r a r i n e s s  c a n  b e  
removed and  t h e  r e a l  wage endogen ized  by l i n k i n g  o u r  l a b o r  
s u p p l y  s y s t e m  w i t h  a  model o f  l a b o r  demand, t h e n  s o l v i n g  t h e  
expanded s y s t e m  s u b j e c t  t o  l a b o r  m a r k e t  c l e a r a n c e  a t  t h e  n a t u r a l  
r a t e  o f  unemployment and  o t h e r  r e s t r i c t i o n s ;  b u t  t h i s  i s  beyond 
t h e  s c o p e  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  p a p e r .  
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W1 is the after-tax nominal wage and PCE is the implicit 
GNP deflator for personal consumption expenditure. W 1  is 
calculated as labor income from private and government 
employment(excluding income originating in the military 
and employer contributions to social security) multiplied 
by one minus the tax rate on labor income and divided by 
total hours worked by private and government employees. 
The tax rate is taken to be the effective rate (personal 
income tax plus social security tax) that would be paid 
by a single individual working full-time at the current 
nominal wage and taking the minimum standard deduction. 
Data on private hours per worker are from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics; average hours of government employees 
are assumed constant at 2,000 per year. 
3. See, for example, Bowen and Finegan (1969), Dernburg and 
Strand (1966), and Tella (1965). In a more recent study, 
Wachter (1972) presents evidence that the short-run 
elasticity of participation rates of secondary workers 
(females and younger and older males) can better be 
explained by "permanent" wages and actual relative to 
permanent wages, rather than by employment fluctuations. 
While our approach is in the more traditional vein., it 
bears some similarities to Wachter's. First, we test 
for direct effects of real wages (current rather than 
permanent) on participation. Second, as we shall see 
in the section on the unemployment equation, the employ- 
ment/labor force ratio is a function of unanticipated 
wage changes; thus, the latter variable has indirect 
effects on participation. Finally, Wachter argues that 
a decline in the actual relative to the permanent wage 
may induce higher participation rates for women, because 
it leads to disappointingly low earnings fortheir husbands. 
We attempt to capture this same phenomenon, but through 
a variable measuring the shifting age structure of the 
male population, as explained below. 
4. These remarks may lead the reader to wonder what happens 
to the participation rates of other groups in the 
projections. Those of males age 16-19 rise gradually, 
while those of younger females decline. The most radical 
changes occur for females 45 and over, whose participation 
rates go up sharply. By 2000, participation rates of 
males and females age 45-64 are about the same. A major 
factor accounting for the relatively large movements in 
female participation is the behavior of NNIMRAT, which 
after peaking at 1.10 in 1981, declines to 0.69 in 2000. 
5. See the papers in Phelps et al. (1970) for expositions 
of search theory and Darby (1976) for a synthesis. A 
good summary of the search and mismatch theories is 
found in Gordon (1978). 
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